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Many who care about Israel have learned to stop caring about 
international law. After all, for forty years, Arab states, members of the 
Non-Aligned Movement and the former Soviet Union, have ceaselessly and 
atrociously manipulated international law so as to turn Israel into a pariah 
state among the nations. Th e UN’s infamous resolutions equating Zionism 
with racism are only the best known examples.¹ Each spring, when the UN 
Commission on Human Rights rolls out its allegations of Israeli human 
rights violations, this political body holds Israel to a far higher standard 
than it does states that have demonstrated far less commitment to the 
Geneva Conventions and the UN Charter.² For good reasons, many who 
love Israel have honed their contempt for international law.³
It can be hard to remember how much energy and optimism Jewish 
leaders invested in the development of international law in the two decades 
immediately following the Shoah. Th ose leaders recalled all too well what 
had happened when the ﬁ rst international legal system, the League of 
Nations, had disintegrated and left Nazi Germany without check, to treat 
its citizens in its own way. Now, it is hard to remember that it was the 
American Jewish Committee that convinced the states’ representatives at 
the San Francisco Conference in 1945 that human rights should become 
one of the pillars of the UN’s mission. Or that it was René Cassin, president 
of the Alliance Israélite Universelle, who drafted the UN Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights. Or that a Polish Jew, Raphael Lemkin, coined 
the term “genocide” and pushed through the UN Genocide Convention. 
Or that two generations of American Jewish leaders saw international law 
as one of the cornerstones of their Never Forget/Never Again program, 
consistent with core Jewish values like tikkun olam, ger lo tilhaz, b’tselem 
elohim, kevod haberiyyoth, mippene darkhe shalom, and ben adam l’ havero. 
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For most of these leaders, support for internationalism in no way con-
ﬂ icted with their support for Jewish nationalism. Th ey saw the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the State of Israel as the twin births of 
1948—both dedicated to making Jews safe from persecution.⁴
If Israelis and their allies in the Diaspora have, since 1967, largely 
given up on international law, however, the rest of the world has not. 
Th e success of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia led, in 2002, to the establishment of a permanent International 
Criminal Court with jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, 
and war crimes. Even without American ratiﬁ cation of the ICC statute, 
international criminal law is arguably stronger now than at any time since 
the Nuremberg Tribunal.
Remembering Jews’ historical commitment to international justice, 
we can only observe with grave concern the extent to which Israeli and 
international law have gradually gone their separate ways over the proper 
approach to the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. In particular, 
the issue of the settlements has raised the conﬂ ict between the two legal 
systems to its highest pitch. Th e tension has grown so acute that, if it is not 
alleviated soon, it may have severe consequences for Israel’s future peace 
and security.
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW
Before comparing the approaches adopted by the two legal systems, it is 
necessary to establish brieﬂ y the history and current scope of the settle-
ments. Since 1967, successive Israeli governments have, directly or indi-
rectly, participated in the transfer of some 230,000 civilians into 145 West 
Bank and Gaza settlements and approximately 110 outposts.⁵ Israeli civilian 
settlement in the territories began as a response of the Eshkol government 
to political pressure to re-settle the Gush Etzion villages and to establish a 
permanent presence in the Golan Heights. Following the Israeli victory in 
the Six-Day War, Golda Meir’s government came under enormous pressure 
to settle in all parts of the biblical Land of Israel. She responded with eﬀ orts 
to develop a small number of security-oriented settlements in Sinai, the 
Golan, and the Jordan Valley. Th e Jordan Valley settlements, the ﬁ rst in 
the West Bank, were conceived under the Allon Settlement Plan (adopted 
in 1974 but circulating since 1970) as agricultural settlements that would 
serve as outposts on Israel’s Eastern front. Settlers, led by Gush Emunim 
leader Rabbi Moshe Levinger, also had early successes in manipulating the 
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Labor government into supporting their extended stay in the Park Hotel 
in the city of Hebron, and eventually their establishment of Qiryat Arba 
on the outskirts of the city.⁶ Still, under the Eshkol, Meir, and Rabin gov-
ernments there was not a great deal of civilian population transfer. By the 
time Menachem Begin and the Likud came to power in 1977, there were 
a total of 3200 settlers.⁷
As Begin biographers Ilan Peleg and Sasson Sofer have shown, Begin 
brought the religious right’s Greater Israel theology, a territorial impera-
tive, and a diplomacy of annexation into the political mainstream, thereby 
opening the gates of settlement.⁸ By the end of his second government as 
Prime Minister in 1983, the number of settlers had increased to 28,400.⁹ 
Moreover, Begin’s second Defense Minister, Ariel Sharon, along with his 
Foreign Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, were to become the architects of a 
concerted expansion of the “facts on the ground.” By contrast with the 
small amount of government support that West Bank civilian settlers 
received in the ﬁ rst decade after the Six-Day War, in recent years, they 
have received government mortgage and housing subsidies, tax incentives, 
business grants, free schooling, infrastructure projects, and defense—to the 
tune of about $146 million in 2002. Since the Oslo Accords were signed in 
1993, there has been a 55 growth in settlement housing and a 100 growth 
in the settler population. Between 1994 and 1997, the Israeli Defense Forces 
(IDF) built 180 miles of bypass roads in the territories to protect settlers 
from sniping, bombing, and drive-by shootings.¹⁰ Th e Military Com-
mander has directed hundreds of thousands of gallons of aquifer water to 
settlements for household, agricultural, and landscaping needs.¹¹
At ﬁ rst glance, international law seems quite plainly to prohibit all of 
these activities. No prohibition could seem more straightforward than the 
one found in the Fourth Geneva Convention, the one on protecting civil-
ians in time of war, adopted on August 12, 1949. Th e Convention’s Article 
49, sixth paragraph, reads as follows: “Th e Occupying Power shall not . . . 
transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.”¹² 
Th e phrasing of this prohibition is absolute, permitting no exceptions. 
Israel ratiﬁ ed the Geneva Conventions on July 6, 1951. Moreover, by now, in 
the view of virtually all international lawyers and every state but Israel, the 
Geneva Conventions have become customary international law, meaning 
that every state is bound by them, whether it has formally become a Party 
to the treaties or not. From this standpoint, it makes no diﬀ erence whether 
one is referring to Labor’s security-oriented settlements of the 1970s, the 
Likud-backed Gush Emunim settlements of the 1980s, Sharon’s suburban 
dormitory settlements around Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv of the 1990s, or the 
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outposts of the new century.¹³ On the peshat reading of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, they are all illegal.
Th e Article 49 prohibition is based on the so-called “law of belliger-
ent occupation,” a part of the traditional Law of Nations that was ﬁ rst 
published in 1907 in the Regulations to Hague Convention IV. Th e Israeli 
High Court of Justice recognizes the Hague Regulations as a binding part 
of customary international law.¹⁴ According to the Regulations, “Territory 
is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the 
hostile army.”¹⁵ Th at is, to be occupied, territory need not belong to any 
sovereign state; it need only be placed under the hostile army’s eﬀ ective 
control. A number of the Hague Regulations insist that occupation must 
have the character of a temporary trusteeship. For example, one Regulation 
speciﬁ es that the occupier is to respect and administer the laws already in 
force in the territory unless absolutely prevented from doing so.¹⁶ While 
all utilities may be seized, they “must be restored and compensation ﬁ xed 
when peace is made.”¹⁷ Th e temporary nature of occupation is most explicit 
with regard to land use. In the words of Article 55, the Occupying Power 
“shall be regarded only as administrator . . . of . . . real estate. . . . It must 
safeguard the capital of these properties.”¹⁸
Th e implication is that the occupier administers the territory for the 
inhabitants while hostilities continue, but must return it to them more or 
less intact when peace has been concluded. Th e purpose of these provisions 
is to prevent occupiers from colonizing or annexing territory. Th e law of 
belligerent occupation aims to protect the territorial integrity of existing 
states, to discourage aggression, and to stabilize world order. While the 
Hague Regulations do not speciﬁ cally mention an occupier’s resettle-
ment of its own civilians, such resettlement, if it appears as a means of de 
facto annexation or colonization of the occupied territory, cuts manifestly 
against their grain.¹⁹
During the half-century that followed the adoption of the Geneva 
Conventions, the law regarding occupant resettlement became ever more 
stringent. Since 1967, the US has voted in favor of ten Security Council 
resolutions that criticized Israel’s failure to abide by the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, including Article 49, and demanded that Israel cease settle-
ment activities and dismantle existing settlements.²⁰ Most recently, the 
drafters of the 1998 Rome Statute, the treaty that established the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, classiﬁ ed resettlement as a war crime within the 
court’s jurisdiction.²¹
Yet, while consistent and clear, international humanitarian norms have 
so far been largely unenforceable. While the Security Council resolutions 
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clearly establish the international norm that the Fourth Convention applies 
to the settlements, the Council has so far never exercised its powers under 
chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter to enforce the norm. (Th is is not 
something President Bush calls attention to when criticizing the Council’s 
track record on enforcement.) Moreover, for a number of reasons to be 
explored in a moment, the Rome Statute’s reclassiﬁ cation of resettlement 
as a war crime is also unenforceable, and can have no practical eﬀ ect on the 
situation in the territories right now. However, both sources of law do serve 
to indicate where the international law of war is heading on this issue.
In addition to being charged with violating the law of war, Israel’s 
resettlement policy has been charged with numerous violations of interna-
tional human rights law. Th e UN treaty bodies that monitor states’ imple-
mentation of the International Bill of Rights, have determined that the 
West Bank and Gaza are under their jurisdiction, and that the settlements 
have resulted in Israel’s violation of Palestinians’ rights to self-determina-
tion, use of natural resources, equality, property, an adequate standard of 
living, and freedom of movement.²²
II. ISRAELI JURISPRUDENCE
From a number of perspectives, international law has prohibited the Israeli 
settlements. Yet Israeli oﬃ  cials have generally ignored or dismissed inter-
national law and have relied instead on the opinions of Israeli jurists and 
legal theorists, who have treated this issue quite diﬀ erently.²³ Th eoretically, 
according to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (entered into 
force, January 27, 1980), international law trumps national law when there 
is a conﬂ ict.²⁴ Practically speaking, however, Israel has been able to observe 
this rule in the breach by refusing to sign the Vienna Convention. (Th is 
does not necessarily relieve Israel of the obligations of the Convention, if the 
treaty’s provisions have been recognized as customary international law.) 
Two conditions have enabled Israeli national jurisprudence to prevail in 
regulating resettlement. Th e enforcement vacuum noted above has meant 
that Israel is under no compulsion to respond to international criticisms, as 
long as it is willing to bear the political consequences for ignoring its treaty 
commitments. Second, the decades of manifest unfairness and politiciza-
tion of the Israeli/Palestinian conﬂ ict in the Zionism=Racism resolution, 
condemnations by the Commission on Human Rights, UNESCO, and 
so on, have enabled Israeli oﬃ  cials to mischaracterize and dismiss all UN 
human rights bodies as anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic.
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It is therefore quite important to understand the extent to which Israeli 
legal theorists and jurists have diﬀ ered in their approach from international 
norms. According to the 1968 “missing reversioner” theory advanced by 
Yehuda Z. Blum, Jordan’s aggression against Israel in 1967 caused it to lose 
its title to the West Bank, creating a sovereignty vacuum that Israel stepped 
in to ﬁ ll. In that case, the Fourth Convention would not apply because 
Israel had not occupied another state’s sovereign territory, there was no 
sovereign to whom the territory could revert, and the settlements could not 
be in violation of the Convention.²⁵ Besides, the Convention is designed 
for armed hostilities between states that are parties to the treaty (Fourth 
Convention, Art. 2); the territories do not comprise a state and therefore 
cannot be a party.²⁶ Finally, the Israeli/Palestinian conﬂ ict does not ﬁ t 
into the Convention’s deﬁ nition of an “armed conﬂ ict not of an interna-
tional character,” because the conﬂ ict occurs in a non-state territory rather 
than “in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties” (Art. 3). 
According to this argument, under the terms of the Convention, the 
Israeli/Palestinian struggle cannot be classiﬁ ed as either an international 
armed conﬂ ict or a non-international armed conﬂ ict, and these are the 
only conﬂ icts covered by the Convention’s deﬁ nition of “occupied terri-
tory.” Th us, Article 49’s prohibition cannot be applied to the West Bank 
settlements.
With the rise of Menachem Begin, the Likud government took this 
theory further and claimed that, in the absence of a sovereign, Israel had 
in fact taken title to the territory, based on the Jews’ ancient ancestral and 
biblical claim to the entire Land of Israel. Begin said, “You can annex 
foreign land. You cannot annex your own country. Judea and Sumaria 
are part of the land of Israel [Eretz Yisrael], where the nation was born.”²⁷ 
Th is is a clear statement of Begin’s policy of de facto annexation through 
settlement.²⁸
Th e Israeli Foreign Ministry has also contributed a rationale for reject-
ing Israel’s de jure obligation to uphold the Fourth Convention, arguing 
that the Convention only prohibits civilian transfers compelled by the 
government, not voluntary transfers undertaken by the civilians them-
selves. Recall the language of Article 49: “Th e Occupying Power shall not 
transfer its own civilians into the territory it occupies” (emphasis added). 
On the Foreign Minister’s reading, even if the Geneva Convention applies, 
voluntary transfers do not violate it, because the Occupying Power is not 
doing the transfer.²⁹
It is worth noting that the “Greater Israel” theory has been disputed 
by prominent Israeli legal authorities. Yoram Dinstein, a Professor of 
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International Law at Tel-Aviv University and the editor of the Israel Year-
book on Human Rights, argued that the Fourth Convention “does not make 
its applicability conditional on recognition of titles” and that “[t]he most 
basic tenet of the law of belligerent occupation is that occupation as such 
does not transfer title to the territory.”³⁰ For Dinstein, the West Bank is 
a case of textbook belligerent occupation, and must be treated as such. A 
third theory, advanced by Moshe Drori and Th omas Kuttner, held that 
the territory was neither a sovereignty vacuum to be ﬁ lled by Israel, nor 
a traditional occupied territory to be administered until the sovereign’s 
return at the conclusion of diplomatic negotiations. Rather, the West Bank 
was being held by a “trustee-occupant,” administering the area until the 
residents were ready to take over. Under this theory, Israel had become the 
new power exercising a mandate over the region, operating in the absence 
of a sovereign, aware of its temporary status, and aiding the inhabitants to 
become self-governing. As a trustee-occupant, the administration would 
still be based on the principles of occupation articulated in Art. 49.³¹
International law also takes issue with the various justiﬁ cations of 
the settlement policy. On the ﬁ rst issue, the inapplicability of Geneva law 
to conﬂ icts other than wars between states parties or those occurring on 
states parties’ territory, international treaties and case law subsequent to 
the Geneva Conventions have sought to broaden the law of war to encom-
pass armed conﬂ icts between state and non-state entities. Both Protocol 
I, a treaty of 1977, as well as a recent judgment from the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) assert that the laws 
of war can apply in armed conﬂ icts between a state and a non-state entity. 
Th e ICTY judges assert that such conﬂ icts must be treated as though they 
were interstate conﬂ icts for the purpose of the application of Geneva law.³² 
Moreover, since Geneva law is accepted as customary everywhere but in 
Israel,³³ the question of whether the territory is under the sovereign control 
of a High Contracting Party is no longer relevant. From this point of view, 
the prohibition of resettlement is applicable in the West Bank even though 
the Israeli-Palestinian crisis is an armed conﬂ ict between a state and a 
non-state entity occurring in a territory belonging to no state party.
On the issue of voluntary transfers, the Rome Statute disagrees with 
the Foreign Minister. Th e Statute classiﬁ es as a war crime, “Th e transfer, 
directly or indirectly, of parts of the Occupying Power’s own civilian popu-
lation into the territory it occupies” [emphasis added].³⁴ Th e drafters of 
the Rome Statute added the phrase “directly or indirectly” to the Fourth 
Convention language in order to reﬂ ect customary international law’s 
prohibition against government encouragement of voluntary resettlement 
122 • israel studies, volume 9, number 3
through subsidies, incentives, and defense.³⁵ Such indirect means have, of 
course, been a part of Israeli government policy since the Allon Settlement 
Plan of 1970, and especially since the Drobles Plan of 1978, as revised by 
Likud governments in 1980 and 1983.³⁶ So here, the Foreign Minister and 
international law are at odds.
For the most part, however, rather than arguing for the inapplicability 
of particular provisions in the Fourth Convention, the Israeli High Court 
of Justice has denied outright the Convention’s jurisdiction over Israel’s 
activities in the territories.³⁷ In 1980, in a case brought by the Palestinian 
mayors of Hebron and Nablus who had been deported to Lebanon, the 
Court rejected the status of the Fourth Convention as customary inter-
national law and discounted its binding nature, claiming that the treaty 
“belongs to conventional international law [as opposed to customary inter-
national law], which does not form part of Israeli municipal law unless 
incorporated by legislation.”³⁸ On the Court’s reading, the Convention 
is non-self-executing, meaning that even though Israel ratiﬁ ed the treaty, 
the government is not bound to apply it unless the Knesset ﬁ rst passes a 
law to that eﬀ ect. Again, Israeli and international law disagree: the U.N. 
Security Council has (with United States support) repeatedly asserted that 
the Fourth Convention is customary, applicable, and binding.³⁹
Th e High Court’s rejection of the applicability of the Geneva Conven-
tion and all later treaties relevant to civilian transfer has compelled it to 
rest its decisions regarding the settlements on the undisputed customary 
law of belligerent occupation as declared in the 1907 Hague Regulations.⁴⁰ 
In the Regulations, the Israeli High Court has been able to ﬁ nd warrant 
for certain kinds of civilian resettlement in the territories. Article 43 of the 
Regulations permits the occupant to alter existing conditions when abso-
lutely necessary to ensure “public order and safety.” Th e High Court has 
interpreted the phrase “public order and safety” to mean the IDF can alter 
existing conditions in cases of “military need.” Th is interpretation enabled 
the court, in the Beth El case of March 1979,⁴¹ to decide that “military 
need” justiﬁ ed the Military Commander in requisitioning privately-owned 
Palestinian land in the West Bank to be turned over to the civilian gov-
ernment for settlement construction. Th e Court wrote that “Jewish settle-
ments in occupied territories serve actual and real security needs” inasmuch 
as civilian settlers can report suspicious activities of occupied inhabitants 
to the IDF. Th is decision seemed to establish the legal basis by which the 
Military Commander could requisition hundreds of thousands of acres of 
privately-owned Palestinian land for settlement construction.⁴²
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Yet only nine months later, the High Court issued a landmark deci-
sion in the Elon Moreh case—a case involving the IDF’s requisition of 
privately held Palestinian land for a new Gush Emunim settlement in the 
West Bank.⁴³ Here, the court used the condition of “military need” to 
rule against the Military Commander and ﬁ nd the requisition order null 
and void, determining that the new settlement was primarily motivated by 
political and religious concerns rather than military need.⁴⁴ In Elon Moreh, 
the Court placed a limit on the kinds of settlements that could be justiﬁ ed 
as military needs. It said:
the decision to establish a permanent settlement intended from the outset 
to remain in its place forever—even beyond the duration of the military 
government which was established in Judea and Sumaria—encounters a 
legal obstacle which is insurmountable, because military government cannot 
create in its area facts for its military needs which are designed ab initio 
[from the outset] to exist even after the end of the military rule in that area, 
when the fate of the area after the termination of military rule is still not 
known. . . .⁴⁵
So the court’s interpretation of the Hague Regulations in Beth El and Elon 
Moreh enabled it to determine that some settlements were lawful—those 
serving military need and intended to be of only temporary duration—
while others were not. Th is approach was far diﬀ erent, of course, from 
the Fourth Convention and the Rome Statute, which simply prohibit 
resettlement altogether.
In the wake of Elon Moreh, the Begin government ceased to requisition 
private lands. Its new approach was to reclassify all unregistered lands in 
the West Bank as “state lands” unless individuals could come forward with 
title papers. Prior to 1967, the Ottoman and Jordanian law in force in the 
West Bank did not require title papers and registration; this meant that 
many Palestinians could not prove ownership of land their families had 
worked for generations. Th is strategy depended on a wholesale reinterpreta-
tion and invalidation of much of the existing law in force in the occupied 
territory, in violation of the Hague Regulations. Nevertheless, it resulted in 
the government claiming about 40 of the West Bank as state land, about 
2,150,000 dunams (or about half a million acres).⁴⁶ Since 1979, 90 of all 
new settlements have been built on these state lands.⁴⁷ By refusing to rule 
on the legality of settlement construction on state lands, the Israeli courts 
have embarked on a collision course with international law, since as we have 
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seen, the Hague Regulations require the Occupying Power to refrain from 
substantial alterations to the real estate under its eﬀ ective control.
Th e Court’s reliance on the Hague Regulations has, in any case, 
resulted in a decision record that frequently diﬀ ers from international 
norms. For one thing, when the court decided in Beth El that civilian 
settlers can serve military needs, it seemed to place settlers somewhere 
between civilians and combatants. Inasmuch as the civilian/combatant 
distinction is the fundamental basis for the international law of war, this 
decision was in conﬂ ict with that law.
In cases relating to the human rights of the settlers themselves, the 
High Court has also departed from the distinction in international law 
between occupied and occupier. In one case, the High Court found that 
even though Jewish settlers are Israeli citizens, they are under IDF adminis-
tration, and, like Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank, may be subject 
to detention without charge, trial, or counsel.⁴⁸ From the standpoint of 
international human rights, which frowns upon administrative detention, 
the High Court’s ruling appears to result in violation of the settlers’ human 
rights.⁴⁹ Here, the court treated settlers as though they were occupied 
rather than occupier.
Overall, the status of the settlers in Israeli jurisprudence has been 
quite ﬂ uid. In some cases the court treats them as occupant civilians, in 
others as occupied civilians, and in others as combatants. Th is ﬂ uidity in 
itself creates a conﬂ ict with the international law of war, because the latter 
seeks to provide a single, clearly deﬁ ned status for each type of participant 
in armed hostilities. From the perspective of international law, the Israeli 
decisions have lacked any discernible philosophical foundation. On the 
other hand, from the Israeli High Court’s perspective, the neat, consistent 
logic of the Geneva norms fails to address the messy conditions of actual 
armed conﬂ ict.
III. CONTEXTUALIZING THE LAW
Th e High Court’s retort emphasizes the importance of contextualization 
in understanding and applying law in situations of armed conﬂ ict. Indeed, 
while law is the necessary basis for a comprehensive consideration of Israeli 
policy towards the settlements, it can never be suﬃ  cient. Other factors that 
would have to be incorporated include:
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 • the historical development of Israeli policy toward the settlements
 • the impact of the settlements on Israeli domestic politics
 • their impact on the Israeli economy
 • their impact on West Bank topography, land use, and administration
 • their impact on the Israeli/Palestinian conﬂ ict, and on the broader 
Middle East conﬂ ict
 • the relation between the settlements and the security barrier
 • their impact on Israeli foreign relations, especially with the United 
Nations, the United States, and the European Union
 • use of U.S. loan guarantees for purposes of settlement expansion
 • water security issues
 • border security issues
 • the historical and ideological development of the various segments of 
the settler movement
 • settlement and the ideologies of Zionism
 • the development of Israeli human rights and refusenik movements
 • settlers and settlements in Israeli popular culture and the arts
Th ree examples will illustrate the crucial role that context plays in the 
interpretation of the law. First, border security issues profoundly aﬀ ect the 
application of the law of belligerent occupation to the settlements. Accord-
ing to UN Security Council Resolution 242 ( June 14, 1967) Israel must 
return “territories” occupied during the Six-Day War. While Palestinian 
representatives have always held that this means Israel must return all ter-
ritories captured, the Israeli government has always held that the absence of 
the deﬁ nite article (the territories) means that Israel must return only some 
of the captured territories. On Israel’s reading, the resolution recognizes 
that the Green Line is a cease-ﬁ re line rather than a permanent border, pro-
viding some small margin on either side of the line open to negotiation.
From this point of view, in a negotiated peace treaty, Israel’s borders 
could be slightly expanded, and this expansion could have the eﬀ ect of 
conferring lawfulness for the future on a number of settlements, even if 
such settlements had been established illegally. Th is was the solution unof-
ﬁ cially reached by negotiators from both sides at the Clinton-brokered 
talks in Taba, Egypt in January 2001.⁵⁰ In that understanding (reﬂ ected 
in the approach taken in the recent private initiative known as the Geneva 
Accord) the suburban dormitory settlements around Jerusalem, ﬁ rst built 
in the late 1980s and 1990s, are to be included in the permanent borders 
of Israel, in exchange for an equal amount of Israeli land ceded to the new 
state of Palestine. Th us, while the Fourth Geneva Convention makes all 
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civilian resettlement unlawful, another legitimate source of international 
law, a Security Council Resolution, seems to permit a narrow exception 
when border security issues are in question.
While this security-based argument seems persuasive for some of 
the Jerusalem settlements, a similar argument will probably not hold up 
when applied to the other main line of settlements built along a border: 
the kibbutzim and moshavim built by Labor as security settlements along 
the Eastern edge of the West Bank under the Allon plan in the mid-1970s. 
Accepting that civilian settlers can serve security functions—and this is a 
debatable assertion, as we have seen—the question of whether the Allon 
settlements serve military need has always rested on the threat of attack 
from Jordan or Iraq. It is no longer clear that Israel faces the same level of 
threat from its Eastern front as it did in the 1970s. Since Jordan and Israel 
have signed a Treaty of Peace, and moreover, have established partnerships 
and cooperation on a broad range of issues, the threat from Jordan seems 
remote.⁵¹ With the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, the state-
sponsored threat from Iraq no longer exists. Th us, the historical context 
that initially undergirded Labor’s establishment of Allon settlements has 
been substantially transformed.
With regard to those settlements built in the interior of the West Bank 
under the Drobles Plan of 1977, with the support of Gush Emunim and 
the Begin and Shamir governments, and expanded by subsequent govern-
ments, we must resort to the contexts of geography and land use planning. 
Topographically, many of the Drobles settlements have been deliberately 
built along the mountain ranges overlooking Palestinian villages, giving 
the settlers a strategic and symbolic advantage. Th e settlements’ topo-
graphical separation from the lowland villages has enabled Israeli planners 
to imagine the West Bank as a patchwork of discontinuous areas held 
together by raised road arteries.⁵² Th e Drobles settlements were placed not 
only above but geographically around the seven major Palestinian cities 
in the West Bank. Th e geographic placement coincided with the political 
aims articulated by Drobles, the World Zionist Organization, the Gush 
Emunim, and the Begin government: to encircle major Palestinian cities 
so as to prevent these cities from growing toward one another or forming 
a contiguous Palestinian state. Th e contexts of topography and land use 
planning help clarify that the mountain-based “encirclement settlements” 
represent precisely the sort of de facto colonization that the law of belliger-
ent occupation prohibits.
Finally, the example of the security barrier that Israel has been build-
ing reveals the degree to which the settlements can have an eﬀ ect on 
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seemingly unrelated questions, and discloses yet another breach between 
Israeli and international jurisprudence. Both the Israeli High Court of 
Justice and the International Court of Justice, in recent opinions about 
the barrier, concur that the West Bank is under the law of belligerent 
occupation, exempliﬁ ed by Th e Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva 
Convention.⁵³ But then their opinions diverge.
According to the Israeli court’s ruling on June 30, 2004, part of the 
barrier’s route “undermines the delicate balance between the obligation 
of the military commander to preserve security and his obligation to pro-
vide for the needs of the local inhabitants.”⁵⁴ Chief Justice Aharon Barak 
ordered 19 miles of the barrier rerouted in order to address Palestinians’ 
humanitarian concerns, but permitted Israel to continue building the 
barrier along a new route in consideration of Israel’s right of self-defense 
against terrorism.⁵⁵ In other words, the HCJ recognized the barrier as 
justiﬁ able, agreeing with the Government that certain Palestinian rights 
(e.g., freedom of movement) are derogable due to severe threats to Israel’s 
national security. It cautioned, however, that “Th e purpose of the separa-
tion fence cannot be to draw a political border,”⁵⁶ and that any route must 
be chosen strictly for security considerations. Where military need can be 
shown to be actually in question, the court does not object to routing the 
barrier into the interior of the West Bank.
On the other hand, according to the July 9, 2004 Advisory Opinion 
of the International Court of Justice, the barrier might be justiﬁ ed under 
Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) only if it hewed close to the Green 
Line.⁵⁷ But the ICJ opinion ﬁ nds that the barrier route does not remain on 
the Green Line but “It is essentially in these [occupied] territories that Israel 
has constructed or plans to construct” the barrier (para. 79).⁵⁸ Also, the 
rationale that might be provided by Resolution 242 does not outweigh the 
barrier’s contravention of other sources of international law. While agree-
ing that, under Art. 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, certain rights are derogable, the ICJ rejected the derogability of 
Palestinians’ freedom of movement in this case. Moreover, it found that the 
barrier violated a number of other Palestinian rights, including the rights 
to work, health, education, and an adequate standard of living.⁵⁹
It was the relation of the barrier to the settlements, however, to which 
the ICJ’s opinion paid the most attention. Th e court argued that, because 
the barrier route was drawn to enclose “80 per cent of the settlers living in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, that is 320,000 individuals,”⁶⁰ it was 
in danger of turning the illegal settlements into Israeli neighborhoods by 
a process of de facto annexation, thus depriving Palestinians of 16 per cent 
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of their territory in the West Bank. Because 160,000 Palestinians would 
also be enclosed by the barrier in “almost completely encircled communi-
ties,”⁶¹ their right to self-determination would also be violated. In other 
words, the barrier exceeds the negotiable margin permitted under 242 
wherever the government extends it eastward into the interior of the West 
Bank. If the eastward portion is employed to defend civilians in any of the 
encirclement settlements, that portion becomes a prop of the resettlement 
eﬀ ort. For these reasons, the ICJ opinion concludes that the barrier must 
be dismantled in its entirety. Here, then, is yet another area of conﬂ ict 
between the two legal regimes.
Even this brief analysis reveals that, if the law’s prescriptions are to 
hold during situations of armed conﬂ ict, legal norms must be applied in the 
contexts that actually obtain. Already in the few cases mentioned, knowl-
edge of the context indicates that in a negotiated, two-state solution, there 
might be justiﬁ cation for Israel’s retention of a few settlements proximate 
to the Green Line, while most would have to be dismantled.
But while the law must be contextualized, it must nevertheless remain 
a primary consideration for anyone who seeks to understand the nuances 
of the settlement issue. Th e claims of international law cannot simply be 
dismissed as the products of anti-Zionism or anti-Semitism, or of a biased 
world order. Th e international law of war began to address the issue of 
civilian resettlement long before the Israeli occupation began. Since 1945, 
the law of occupation has largely developed independently of UN bodies 
(like the General Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights) that 
have demonstrated a pattern of gross and reliably attested bias towards 
Israel. Moreover, a key means by which Israel can resist the attempts of its 
enemies to isolate it as a pariah state is by upholding the norms of treaties 
to which it has bound itself. No one wants to imitate the Commission on 
Human Rights by holding Israel to a higher standard than other states; 
but on the other hand, Israel’s supporters should not seek to hold it to a 
lower standard, either. Finally, Israeli policymakers ignore the law at their 
peril, since it is the interaction of legal norms with sociopolitical realities 
that will ultimately determine the fate of the settlements.
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
Assuming policymakers wish to adhere to the law regarding the settle-
ments, to which law should they adhere?⁶² As we have seen, the ten-
sion between international and Israeli law has been very high. So far, 
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international law’s relatively weak enforcement mechanisms have permit-
ted lawmakers to rely on Israel’s internal jurisprudence. Yet this state of 
aﬀ airs may be in transition, due to the establishment of the International 
Criminal Court in 2002. At the moment, the ICC cannot prosecute Israeli 
oﬃ  cials and military commanders for the war crime of resettlement. While 
the UN Security Council has the authority to refer a situation taking place 
anywhere in the world to the new Court, Israelis are protected from such 
a referral by the United States’ veto power. Other potential plaintiﬀ s may 
lodge a complaint only if either Israel or the Palestinian Authority has rati-
ﬁ ed the Rome Statute. But Israel will not ratify it, and the PA cannot do 
so, having no treaty-making power.⁶³ So Israelis are apparently immune 
from these plaintiﬀ s as well.
Under a number of diﬀ erent scenarios, however, the Court may yet 
gain jurisdiction over a case. To take only the most obvious possibility: 
the United States could decide to abstain on or vote in favor of a Secu-
rity Council referral to the ICC. Considering the Bush Administration’s 
recent declaration of support for making some settlements permanent, this 
scenario is unlikely to materialize any time soon. Yet given the consistent 
position taken by U.S. governments in Security Council resolutions for a 
quarter of a century, it is at least possible that a future American adminis-
tration will ﬁ nd it in its interest to placate world and Arab opinion by per-
mitting an ICC inquiry into Israel’s resettlement activities to go forward.
We are left to ponder what the broader consequences might be, if an 
Israeli high oﬃ  cial were tried and convicted by the international court 
as a war criminal. Some possibilities include the heightening of hostili-
ties and the weakening of Israel’s negotiating posture; the renegotiation 
of the US-Israel alliance; international ostracism the like of which even 
Israel has never seen; and, as the trial was played out on Israeli television, 
internal strife that could range anywhere from increasing factionalism to 
serious civil disturbances. And on top of all this, there would be the shame 
and anger of knowing that an international court had branded an Israeli 
national as one of the world’s worst criminals.
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